Military Economic Strategy Prior to the agreement of August, 2019 which created the military-civilian transitional government, Sudan’s military commandeered:

An estimated 74% of the national budget, much of which may be accounted for via secret national security funds from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other foreign nations in payment for mercenary soldiers provided by Sudan’s military to the war in Yemen (and in 2020, the war in Libya);

In addition, the military owns in full or part many private enterprises in gold, oil, and other strategic resources, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, commerce and security. Since the revenues and profits of military businesses are opaque, their share of Sudan’s gross domestic product (GDP) is not known, but is estimated to be considerable.

And finally, the military secured pledges of $3 billion from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, some of which had been transferred and spent prior to the installation of the civilian side of the transitional government under PM Hamdok.

So, as the transitional government was formed, Sudan’s military were in a strong economic position, and after one year of transitional governing with civilians, are probably in a stronger position when compared to the civilians in government.  

All three sources of military revenue appear to be flowing to them unimpeded, unchallenged and without much comment. Funds for Sudanese RSF mercenaries in Libya, funds from business and deals in Sudan, and funds from Middle Eastern nations and perhaps Russia, are all transacting but unknown to the public in detail.    

A full accounting of the $3 billion pledged by the Saudis and Emirates, if received and spent, has not been published. Has the military invested funds in economic development projects that could reduce scarcity of food, fuel, medicines or imported goods needed by the public? Where did all that Middle Eastern money go?  In a democracy, any citizen would know that.

However, as the Covid19 pandemic impacted Sudan in May, 2020, the military was reported to be providing protective equipment to Sudan’s hospitals and health care facilities directly. Whether the military was coordinating that effort with the civilian Ministry of Health or the World Health Organization in Khartoum, is not known.

    Civilian Economic Strategy 
    By contrast, the civilians came into government in August, 2019 with access to minimal funds to run a government and virtually no funds to take economic development initiatives, which put the civilian government at an immediate strategic disadvantage.

    PM Hamdok could pay salaries to ministers and key staff but the billions of dollars needed for massive programs to impact economic development, job creation, production of food and fuel, and meeting dozens of other needs of over 40 million citizens – needs which had generated protests that changed government -- were lacking.

    Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Middle Eastern supporters of Sudan – none of which are functioning democracies -- had already delivered funds to the military transitional council before the civilians were part of government. The Middle East was busy with Saudi-Iranian conflicts in a handful of violent conflicts stretching from Afghanistan to Iraq to Syria to Yemen to Palestine and to Libya. Economic development of Sudan’s burgeoning democracy was not close to their top priority: containing Iran, which Sudan’s military had already agreed to do.

    So, as a strategic move in September, 2019, Sudan’s civilian leaders turned to supporters of democracy and development such as the USA, the U.N., Europe, the World Bank and the IMF to plead for emergency humanitarian aid and development funds. PM Hamdok’s case was that if socio-economic conditions worsened after Bashir was removed by democratic protests, hungry and jobless Sudanese might turn against democracy itself. He was deadly serious. And he was also right.

    Hamdok’s appeals to the West were met with nice words of congratulation, promises to find some funds for Sudan, and oft-repeated U.S. commitments and rumors to remove sanctions and state-sponsor-of-terror designation of Sudan, a terror designation which was untrue of Sudan according to U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency reports showing Sudan was a U.S. ally against terrorism and not a sponsor of it. Terror-designation has effectively decapitated public and private investment in Sudan for three decades, and still does.

    By February, 2020, Hamdok had raised expectations of Western aid that actually was very slow in coming, if it was coming at all, and then the coronavirus Covid19 attacked China, then Italy, then the USA and then the world, sending the global economy into a tailspin comparable to the Great Depression of 1929. Saudi and Chinese investment funds for Sudan dried up fast, and the West was agonizingly slow in providing even humanitarian assistance to Sudan.

    The June 30th 2020 demonstrations in Sudan, instead of solidifying progress toward democratic freedom and change, were arguing for civilian governance and against military rule, goals which many in Sudan and beyond assumed were achieved by the ouster of Bashir a year before. Hamdok responded by replacing four ministers, a cosmetic change. While he had recovered between $3.5 and $4 billion of Bashir’s assets and received commitments from “Friends of Sudan” for $1.8 billion in new assistance, not all of it was immediately accessible.

    As BSN reports elsewhere on this site, Sudan needs $50 billion in sustainable development investment in agriculture, energy, and tourism in order to produce the jobs it needs to keep pace with one of the world’s youngest populations, two-thirds of whom were born during Bashir’s rule. Unemployment, scarcity of goods and inflation have soared above the 2019 rates, which the population has blamed on the civilians in government not the military rulers who really pull the strings of power.

    A strategy to generate $50 billion principally from the West does exist. But the civilians new to government and foreign affairs are operating under daily crisis management responses to emergencies, which is perhaps to be expected after three decades of being frozen out of power. A new initiative is needed toward the USA, Europe, the World Bank, the IMF and especially the private sector in Sudan and private investment globally.